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Chapter Three
Barack Obama: From an End to Terror to Drone Wars and ISIS
Barack Obama came to office with a mandate to reverse George W. Bush’s
policies. As Daniel Klaidman writes, “Obama was elected, in part, to wind down the
wars of 9/11, to reduce America’s global footprint, and to refocus national energies on
challenges at home and core interests abroad” 1. Obama’s relative quiescence on the
terror threat led Benjamin H. Friedman and I ask to, in a 2012 conference paper, “What
Happened to the Terror Threat?” 2.
Where George W. Bush sought to stoke fears in order to sell policies and set an
expansive anti-terrorist agenda, Obama was more careful and calibrated in his words
about terrorists. His rhetoric deviated from Bush’s themes in many respects as will be
evidenced in this chapter. Obama exhibited the power of presidential rhetoric to
assuage the public. The Founders saw the value in public speech-making as a way to
calm public concerns and envisioned that the purpose of presidential rhetoric would be
to stifle mass fear as Obama attempted to do 3.
Obama introduced a new vision for the war against terror. Prior to becoming
President, Obama’s “most famous foreign policy stance” was his strong opposition to
the war in Iraq. Obama specifically doubted, in a 2002 speech he made as a Senator, the
possibility of externally imposing democracy on Iraqis 4. As a candidate, Obama sought
to link the world’s problems to America. He noted that poverty in other countries could
create the conditions for radicalism and terrorism 5. As Wesley Windmaier observed,
“Over the first decade of the 2000s, the George W. Bush administration’s crusading
excesses incited the Obama administration’s realist restraint” 6. This restraint and desire
to undo Bush’s expansive policies motivated the early Obama administration.
Despite that, this chapter will show that Obama’s rhetoric failed to achieve
substantive policy changes in the complex, thorny world of undoing a worldwide
counterterror war machine and that Obama’s policies and rhetoric were more
pragmatic than idealistic. Indeed, Obama’s goal of recalibrating the terror threat was
paired with the goal to seem tough to America’s adversaries and to project security to
the American public. This chapter will show that the story of a president who
conducted and spoke about the terror war in the diametrically opposite way to his
predecessor is not true. In fact, Obama ended up maintaining much of President George
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W. Bush’s policies and practices including the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay
(which he did empty of most detainees), the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars (though he did
wind down Iraq only to get dragged back in by ISIS), and the USA Patriot Act. Obama
notably eliminated George W. Bush’s “enhanced interrogation” program but cynically
replaced it with a program of lethal drone 7 strikes. President Obama also, as his tenure
progressed, was not opposed to employing the rhetoric of fear or of playing up the
terrorist threat. He also had to recalibrate his rhetoric in light of what turned out to be a
very real threat from ISIS8. The next section will delve into some ways that Obama’s
rhetoric on terrorism diverged from Bush 43’s according to the database on presidential
rhetoric gathered for this book.
“No Drama” Obama: A Distinct Change in Terrorism Themes
Obama made many fewer speeches than Bush did regarding the terror threat. So
much fewer that we had to re-check the data multiple times to see if our numbers on
Obama were, in fact, correct. Counting speeches where some derivation of the word
“terror” was made three times, Obama’s rhetoric on terrorism jumps out as
demonstrably less voluminous than Bush’s. George W. Bush made a huge amount of
speeches in the immediate aftermath of 9/11: 85 in 2001 and 169 in 2002, but then made
between 28 and 30 speeches every other year of his presidency with one exception—in
2006 when he was selling the Iraq troop surge he made 46 speeches. Obama’s high
annual number of terrorism speeches (28) equated to Bush’s low. Between 2011 and
2014, a four year period, Obama made only 45 total terrorism speeches—one less than
Bush did in 2006 alone. It was during this period (in 2013) that Obama declared that al
Qaeda was “on the path to defeat” and that another 9/11 was unlikely 9. Obama made
only 15 terrorism speeches in 2011, 9 in 2012, 10 in 2013 and 11 in 2014. Note that Osama
bin-Laden was killed on May 2, 2011, which Obama saw as a bookend to the 9/11
attacks.
The rise of ISIS, however, led Obama to refocus on the terror threat. He made 22
terrorism speeches in 2015 and 18 in 2016. Interestingly, Obama’s speeches on terrorism
were most frequent in the beginning and end of his term. He made 22 such speeches in
2009 and 28 in 2010 as he sought to unwind Bush’s policies. He then substantially toned
down his rhetoric on terrorism until it was more than obvious that ISIS was an
important threat that the country needed to face. Whereas Bush’s post-9/11 terrorism
speech frequency looks like a large bump followed by a plateau, Obama’s looks like a
small bump followed by a trough and another small bump (see Chart 1.1). To this end,
Obama’s speech-making on terrorism did not markedly change from his first to his
second term. He was always pragmatic about the terror threat and throughout
7
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continued with most of George W. Bush’s programs. Obama’s speech frequency on the
subject jumped when he was trying to change or sell policies—such as in the beginning
of his first term when he sought to close the Guantanamo Bay Detention Center and
toward the end of his second term when he sought to mobilize against the threat of ISIS.
President Obama consciously wanted to recalibrate how America viewed its
terrorist enemies. He purposely used concrete terms for describing them. No longer
would the terms “barbaric” or “evil” be used. Obama saw rhetoric as critically
important in conveying the terror threat level to the public. Ironically, he was much
more careful with his words than he was with his deeds—as he carried out a much
deadlier assassination program of Muslim terrorists than any of his predecessors had 10.
With few exceptions, the database shows that Obama typically referred to America’s
opponents by the names of the groups they were in (when, like Bush, he wasn’t calling
them “terrorists”).
[Insert Table 3.1 Here]
The biggest change between Obama and Bush is that Obama no longer called
terrorists “evil” or “murderers/killers” or “barbarians.” Instead, he largely stuck to
concrete terms such as al Qaeda, al Nusra Front, and the Taliban. Note in Table 3.1 how
Obama moved from a focus on al Qaeda and extremism to a heavy focus on ISIS. Here
we see Obama scrambling in his final years in office to show that he took the ISIS threat
seriously, even though his initial impulse was to diminish and dismiss the group.
With the rise of ISIS, Obama did some policy selling of his own as he pushed for
more resources for the fight against the so-called “caliphate.” Obama’s disciplined
rhetoric turned to the language of fear and hyperbole in 2015 and 2016. In 2015, Obama
referred to terrorists as “killers” for the only time in his tenure and referred to ISIS as an
“apocalyptic cult.” In 2016, he referred to ISIS as “enemies of peace.” These rhetorical
forays are nothing compared to Bush’s terms used for terrorists. In 2003 alone, Bush 43
called terrorists “thugs,” “evil,” “brutal,” “cruel,” and referred to them as “a hidden
network of killers.”
As a candidate, Obama sought to focus American counterterror policy on al
Qaeda and the war in Afghanistan and to wind down the Iraq conflict. Chart 3.1
exhibits what countries and conflicts Obama linked the terror threat to over his two
terms in office. When Obama began his first term, the Afghanistan War hit its worst
year for U.S. armed forces with 317 Americans killed in 2009 11. The President, who had
sought to exit Iraq and double-down on Afghanistan 12, entered a precarious public
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opinion situation. The American public was split on the Afghanistan War with less than
half (47%) supporting the conflict and a little more than half in opposition (51%) 13.
In Chart 3.1, note the heavy focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2009 to 2011
followed by a bump in linking the terror threat to Iraq in 2015 and 2016. Here Obama
exemplifies an attempt to set a new agenda in the war on terror, one more heavily
focused on Afghanistan and al Qaeda. The President pivoted away from a discussion of
Afghanistan with relation to the terror threat after the 2011 killing of bin Laden even
though coalition fatalities in Afghanistan spiked in 2009 (from 295 to 521) then again in
2010 (from 521 to 710) and remained high for the next few years (563 in 2011, 402 in
2012, 162 in 2013) 14. Obama, however, had already sold his surge in Afghanistan and so
did not need to speak much about that conflict after 2011.
[Insert Chart 3.1 Here]
Adam Hodges concluded that “the Bush ‘War on Terror’ Narrative [was] a
discursive formation that sustain[ed] a regime of truth”15. With the election of Barack
Obama, however, that narrative “subtly slipped out of presidential discourse.”
Suddenly, Afghanistan and Iraq were separate wars and not fronts in a global war
against ideologically-opposed enemies 16. Anthony DiMaggio emphasized that by the
time Obama came to power, fear-mongering rhetoric may have lost much of its
effectiveness 17. Yet another reason to change thematic course. Still, these declarations of
an end to Bush’s War on Terror narrative were, as we shall see, premature. Obama
tamped down Bush’s rhetoric but kept alive many of the same themes.
President Obama uniformly touched on the themes gathered for this project less
than Bush did—but, as the data shows, he was not averse to ratcheting up the terror
threat. These differences were largely due to Obama’s reduced number of total
speeches, but in some cases they had to do with a concerted effort to tone down the
threat. Whereas George W. Bush’s speeches framed terrorism as a multi-front war and
stated that America’s terrorist enemies were part of a worldwide conspiracy, Obama’s
speeches did the opposite. Chart 3.2 compares Bush 43 and Obama on the theme of
worldwide conspiracy. It shows that George W. Bush was much more likely to push
this theme in his speeches and Obama decidedly was not. The line for “Yes conspiracy”
depicts the speeches where this theme was present and “No conspiracy” where this
theme was absent. Note that for most years under Bush, the “Yes conspiracy” line is
higher and for Obama’s years the “No conspiracy” line is higher—at the very end of
Obama’s term the lines do almost meet. This shows that not only in frequency but also
in proportion of speeches, Bush 43 employed a strategy of linking terrorism to a
13
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worldwide conspiracy more than President Obama did. For President Obama, the
worldwide conspiracy theme was stated much less frequently and most of his speeches
did not include this theme. The evidence, then, shows a concerted effort to move away
from this theme.
[Insert Chart 3.2 Here]
Barack Obama did mention the threat of weapons of mass destruction in his
speeches on terrorism, but did so with less frequency than Bush did. President Obama
mentioned the theme of the threat of WMD linked to terrorism 9 times in 2009, 8 times
in 2010, twice in 2011, 4 times in 2012, 7 times in 2013, twice in 2014, 6 times in 2015, and
4 times in 2016. Many of Obama’s mentions of WMD had to do with his push to
eradicate nuclear weapons worldwide, a quest that earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in
2010. Obama was not as focused on the threat of WMD terrorism as his predecessor
was, but he was very concerned with the dismantling of these weapons. He also had to
speak about these weapons repeatedly due to the civil conflict in Syria and the chemical
weapons used in that war. The connection between terrorism and WMD was seen by
some as an egregious oversell by the George W. Bush administration 18, yet the “antiBush” Obama continued the use of this theme albeit to a much lesser degree.
The following paragraph from Obama’s June 19, 2013 speech at Brandenburg
Gate in Germany provides insights into how the President weaved the threats of WMD
with terrorism and world poverty.
“We may no longer live in fear of global annihilation, but so long as nuclear
weapons exist, we are not truly safe. We may strike blows against terrorist
networks, but if we ignore the instability and intolerance that fuels extremism,
our own freedom will eventually be endangered. We may enjoy a standard of
living that is the envy of the world, but so long as hundreds of millions endure
the agony of an empty stomach or the anguish of unemployment, we’re not
truly prosperous” 19.
Here Obama is not discussing nuclear terrorism per se but does link nuclear weapons
with extremism and poverty by successively discussing each issue.
[Insert Chart 3.3 Here]
As Chart 3.4 depicts, Obama largely pushed aside the theme of terrorism as an
existential threat to the United States. The exception being in 2015, when Obama was
focused on the threat of ISIS. President Obama, as Chart 3.5 illustrates, did not hammer
18
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on the theme that the war on terror was necessary until his second term. Here we see a
decided trend: Obama sought to recalibrate how the terror threat was viewed by
narrowing the agenda of the war on terror, then he got caught flat-footed by ISIS and
changed his approach to one that looked more similar to George W. Bush’s.
It is critical to note here that Obama did not uniformly dismiss the terror threat
and did, at times, emphasize its significance. For instance on March 27, 2009, Obama
stated that, “Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively
planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan. And if
the Afghan government falls to the Taliban -- or allows al Qaeda to go unchallenged -that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as
they possibly can” 20. Here the existential threat from terrorism, far from being tamped
down, is plainly evident in the hypothetical situation wherein a Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan would unleash bloodthirsty terrorists. Indeed, despite Obama’s reputation
to the contrary, he stated that he would not “hesitate to use force to take out terrorists”
while on the campaign trail 21.
[Insert Chart 3.4 Here]
[Insert Chart 3.5 Here]
Finally, Obama made a concerted effort to frame the terror threat as having
lessened. Chart 3.6 depicts the speeches wherein Obama touches on the theme of a
diminished terror threat. Note that George W. Bush also at times emphasized America’s
successes against al Qaeda leading to a reduced threat. For instance, in February 2006
Bush 43 stated that the global war on terror had “weakened” al Qaeda whilst he was
selling the troop surge in Iraq 22. Chart 3.7 depicts the occurrences of a similar theme in
Bush and Obama’s presidential speeches, that of the war on terror entailing a long war.
Here Obama was much less likely to emphasize the long war that the terror conflict
entailed, but did touch on this theme periodically.
[Insert Chart 3.6 Here]
[Insert Chart 3.7 Here]

Obama: From Anti-War Purism to Pragmatism
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Barack Obama’s vision for the War on Terror, outlined in a July 2008 campaign
speech, drew from growing anti-war sentiment among the American public. Obama
sought to bridge frayed alliances, largely exit the Iraq War within sixteen months and to
focus American counterterror efforts on Afghanistan and specifically al-Qaeda and the
Taliban there 23. On Christmas Day 2009, a terrorist attempted to ignite a bomb sewn
into his underwear while in a plane landing in Detroit. President Obama’s response was
slow and silent 24. He did make a prolonged formal speech on the matter on December
29, 2009 that dealt mainly with intelligence failures that led to the foiled attack and
immediate actions meant to ensure the security of air travel25. Obama’s legalistic
approach to the event led his opponents, like former vice president Dick Cheney, to
contend that Obama “is trying to pretend that we are not at war” 26.
President Obama wanted to change the tenor and tone of the war on terror. Like
other progressive voices27, he sought to play down rather than ratchet up the terror
threat. This impulse was meant to take the wind out of the sails of terrorists who, the
thinking went, gained notoriety and power when their actions were acknowledged and
feared. When Obama came into office, he reexamined the entire edifice of Bush’s war on
terror: the wars, the torture methods, the endless detentions. He knew where his
principles stood but also wanted to understand current policy and what was possible 28.
Obama’s pragmatism is sometimes lost in the narrative that Obama simply represented
the opposite of George W. Bush and his policies. For instance, Hillary Clinton criticized
Obama’s approach to foreign policy as “too slow and cautious.” She believed that
Obama had overcorrected for his predecessor’s policies. She argued that, “Great nations
need organizing principles, and ‘Don’t do stupid stuff’ is not an organizing principle” 29.
This narrative came from Obama’s own campaign. He “campaigned as the antiGeorge W. Bush,” claiming that he would stop using the Guantanamo Bay Detention
Center as an “extralegal” holding ground for terror suspects, bring terrorists before
civilian courts and end the Iraq War30. Yet, rather than simply playing the reverse game
plan of George W. Bush, President Obama took a decidedly pragmatic approach to
foreign policy, seeking to avoid the perceived overreactions of the Bush
Administration 31. For instance, Obama declared “a new beginning” for American
relations with the Muslim World, one in which incremental, rather than sudden, reform
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would be the goal32. Bush’s perceived overreactions, of course, were at least partly due
to the emotional reactions to the September 11 attacks. Another early example of
Obama needing to employ pragmatism came with the 2008 Boumediene v. Bush Supreme
Court decision, which complicated things for then-candidate-Obama. The decision
restored the habeas corpus rights of the Guantanamo Bay detainees. In other words, they
could now challenge their detentions in federal court 33.
When Obama came to office his civil libertarian and anti-war purism had to
wrestle with a much more complicated reality than he anticipated. For instance, the
military Obama came to lead was still very much on an aggressive, Global War on
Terror footing 34. Obama navigated this space carefully, seeking more precision and
transparency in his government’s use of force against terrorists 35. Yet Obama was not
dogmatic. Klaidman quotes a military source who noted that the President was “willing
to change his mind” 36.
President Obama sought to end some of the excesses of the war on terror
including so-called coercive interrogation techniques37. But the extent of the use of these
techniques was not fully appreciated. Attorney-General Eric Holder discovered “an
interrogation regime whose psychological brutality and moral depravity went beyond
anything” he had imagined 38. Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, who was behind the
operational planning for 9/11, had been water-boarded 183 times; Abu Zubaydah,
another al Qaeda operative, was water-boarded 83 times. There were also mock
executions where detainees were made to believe they had just been shot to death.
Detainees “were told their children would be killed or their wives raped if they didn’t
cooperate. One detainee had a gun and then a power drill waved in front of his head.”
Holder uncovered the case of Gul Rahman, who died in custody on November 20, 2002
after having been left in the cold overnight hanging, shackled and half-naked in a secret
CIA site in Kabul called the Salt Pit 39. After the Bush torture memos were released,
depicting tales of detainees being sleep deprived for 11 days and water-boarded, the
Obama Administration was surprised to see that the public response was minimal 40.
While the Obama Administration worked on closing Guantanamo, holdovers
from Bush’s reign exhibited confusion. Obama made it seem as if Bush had no interest
in closing Guantanamo, yet Bush had “transferred more than five hundred detainees
out of the camp—more than twice as many as remained.” What were left were the
hardest cases41. Indeed, Obama would find that there were some terrorist detainees in
Guantanamo, such as one who had declared his allegiance to al Qaeda and another who
32
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had been trained to make bombs, who could neither be tried nor released42. These he
eventually reduced to forty-eight detainees 43.
President Obama tried to stay true to his campaign promises while navigating a
policy space that was more complicated than expected 44. Unlike President George W.
Bush, whose “war on terror” was oft-criticized for its excesses, President Obama got
excoriated for “criminalizing” the fight against terrorists. One specific instance came
when he announced that he would try 9/11 mastermind Khaled Sheikh Mohammed
and some of his co-conspirators in federal court in Manhattan45. Obama’s reputation for
being soft on terrorists, however, was misplaced.
Obama and the Rhetoric of Fear
Despite his reputation to the contrary, President Obama did continue to
underline the importance of combatting extremism. For instance, in a January 22, 2009
speech, he described Afghanistan as “the central front in our enduring struggle against
terrorism and extremism” 46. That wording may not have been specifically chosen by
President George W. Bush, but it wasn’t far off from what Bush might say.
Like George W. Bush before him, Obama also vouched for a surge of troops—but
this time in Afghanistan. On December 1, 2009, in a speech at West Point Military
Academy, Obama mirrored Bush’s language after 9/11 stating: “We did not ask for this
fight. On September 11, 2001, nineteen men hijacked four airplanes and used them to
murder nearly 3,000 people. They struck our military and economic nerve centers. They
took the lives of innocent men, women, and children without regard to their faith or
race or station” 47. Obama conceded that al-Qaeda had moved on to Pakistan but held
that a troop surge in Afghanistan would stop a potential Taliban resurgence. Regarding
al Qaeda, Obama sounded the alarms, stating that, “new attacks are being plotted as I
speak. This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat”48. Also like Bush before him,
Obama tied the fight against terrorism to the promotion of freedom, democracy and
human rights in the countries America had invaded49. Contrary to popular imagination,
“the rhetoric of fear and hope persisted under Obama” 50.
Anthony DiMaggio found that the Obama Administration was able to garner
public support for the surge in Afghanistan through a calculated campaign of rhetorical
persuasion 51. This policy selling was successful and included an agenda shift (away
from Iraq, toward Afghanistan). After the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011,
42
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Obama proclaimed that al Qaeda was “under more pressure than at any time since
September 11” with half their leadership decimated and no way to replace it 52. This
framing of the conflict, as one America was decidedly winning, led to a significant
withdrawal of troops (43,000 in total) from Afghanistan over the next sixteen months53.
Obama, Drones and Credibility
Obama’s war on terror strategy deviated greatly in practice from what his
supporters imagined it would be. It represented “a steady torrent of targeted killings
and other kinetic operations” meant to prevent terrorists from ever getting the chance to
attack Americans54. Daniel Klaidman relates that this had a marked effect on al Qaeda.
A young operative noted to Newsweek that “no one is active and planning operations
anymore…the once glorious chapter of al-Qaeda is being closed” 55. Obama’s “kill list”
had become a matter of course until a leak revealed to the press that Anwar Awlaki, an
American citizen endowed with all of the due process and constitutional rights of such
an individual, had been on the CIA death list 56. The Awlaki killing raised alarm bells
among civil libertarians 57, but did not deter the drone program.
While President Obama fought over where Khaled Sheikh Mohammed should be
tried (a civilian trial in Manhattan eventually became an impossibility for practical and
political reasons), he was increasingly using the Joint Special Operations Command
(JSOC) to conduct “kinetic operations” and targeted killings 58. Klaidman writes that, by
2010, “Obama had approved the killings of twice as many suspected terrorists as had
ever been imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay” 59. The Council on Foreign Relations finds
that Obama authorized 542 drone strikes killing an estimated 3,797 people. His glibness
regarding these strikes, which killed at least 324 civilians, is captured in this 2011
comment he reportedly made to a senior aide, “Turns out I’m really good at killing
people. Didn’t know that was gonna be a strong suit of mine” 60.
President Obama’s targeted killing strategy came to a crescendo with the
operation that killed Osama bin-Laden 61. The bin Laden raid also emboldened JSOC
and other military commanders who salivated over the opportunity to “deliver a
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‘knockout blow’” to al Qaeda via aggressive targeted killings 62. At the same time,
President Obama was seeing the problems inherent in capturing terrorists. Ahmed
Warsame, a Somali operative, continued to be held on the USS Boxer given a lack of
viable alternatives 63. The war on terror was entering a strange middle phase where
Bush’s policies were not completely unwound, where targeted killing—a policy Israel
had taken considerable flak for during the Second Intifada—ran rampant, where
Obama was criticized for not taking a war seriously when he was actually doing quite a
lot of killing, and where the options available for detaining terrorists were scant.
Obama’s conduct in his drone war drove a wedge between his values and his
practices. While he was reportedly uncomfortable with signature strikes, which are
drone strikes that target groups of military-age males where intelligence on exactly who
is being targeted is foggy, he pragmatically allowed them to continue 64. Of course, these
strikes were extremely unpopular in Pakistan 65. Strikes based upon signals
intelligence 66 alone surely would have had anti-war activists up in arms if George W.
Bush had conducted them, Obama got away with these strikes with little criticism. In
sum, Barack Obama’s version of the war on terror looked much different than an antiBush approach would. It essentially devolved into an assassination campaign 67. As
Daniel Klaidman summarizes:
“Barack Obama’s ferocious campaign of targeted killings was for many the
central paradox of his war on terror. While running for president, he had railed
against waterboarding, illegal detentions, and the Bush administration’s
penchant for secrecy. In lofty speeches, he promised to restore America’s
reputation as a benign superpower, a paragon of international law and human
rights. But a year into his presidency, the most noticeable strategic shift in his
fight against al-Qaeda was the unrelenting use of hard, lethal power in the form
of the CIA’s covert drone program. By the time Obama accepted the Nobel Peace
Prize in December 2009, he had authorized more drone strikes that George W.
Bush had approved during this entire presidency. (There were only 9 strikes
conducted in Pakistan between 2004 and 2007. In 2010 there were 111)”68.
The juxtaposition of “lofty speeches” and a Nobel Peace Prize pitted against an ugly
campaign of assassinations in an ever-broadening terror war led to the loss of President
Obama’s credibility on the issue of terrorism.
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President Obama and Credibility Gaps: Benghazi, Syria and ISIS
The ever-expanding drone war strained President Obama’s anti-war, civil
libertarian credentials. But, Obama’s policy of toning down the terror threat really
began to unravel when the U.S. embassy was attacked in Benghazi, Libya on September
11, 2012. Four Americans were killed in the attack and ten injured. Yet Obama avoided
using the word “terrorism” completely in his 60 Minutes interview the next day 69.
Instead his administration blamed the attack on spontaneous “protests” made in
response to an anti-Muslim Youtube video 70. When the Syrian civil war began in 2011,
Obama’s doctrinaire anti-war approach also caught him flat-footed as the conflict
metastasized into a gruesome conflagration replete with wantonly violent insurgents,
foreign fighters and chemical bombings. Obama’s credibility gap grew as the failure of
Benghazi was coupled with the failure to act against the August 2013 chemical attacks
committed by the Syrian government against its own people 71.
The rise of ISIS would only erode the President’s credibility further. Consistent
with a rhetorical game plan set on assuaging the public and reducing the notoriety of
terrorists, Obama sought to play down the threat from ISIS. Recall that Obama’s
agenda-setting goals were to erase the mistake of Iraq by withdrawing from that
conflict and to employ rhetoric to diminish the terror threat 72. When ISIS conquered
Mosul in June 2014, Obama’s rhetorical strategy collapsed. Five months earlier, the
President had unfortunately dubbed ISIS “the jayvee team” in an interview with The
New Yorker 73. He explained that, “If a jayvee team puts on Lakers uniforms that doesn’t
make them Kobe Bryant”74. In May 2014, Obama drew a line between his preferred
methods of counterterrorism and war, implying that Bush’s policies were wrong or
over-expansive and that new policies would be more precise 75. Regrettably, Obama’s
desire to drop the Iraq conflict led him to ignore the anti-Sunni dictatorship that had
been forming under Nuri al-Maliki 76. While Obama was touting Iraq’s march toward
democracy in 2011, Iraq’s deputy prime minister was stating that Maliki was the worst
dictator the country had ever seen 77.
The fall of Mosul and the subsequent massacre and enslavement of Yazidis two
months later, finally pulled Obama’s attention to ISIS. The U.S. began a bombing
campaign against the group in early August 2014, but toward the end of the month
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President Obama stated that America still did not have a strategy for ISIS. It was not
until September 2014 that Obama declared that America’s goal would be to “degrade
and destroy” the Islamic State 78.
To his credit, Obama had attempted to withhold acknowledgment of the group
in the hopes that doing so might take the wind out of their sails. This strategy of
attempting to diminish the terror threat came straight from the anti-Bush playbook. Yet,
the strategy had either run its course or was miscast in this role. ISIS turned out to be a
venerable and deadly foe that Obama eventually would attack with considerable
military might. Obama had also lost on his bet that withdrawing from Iraq would pay
off in the long run. The vacuum created by U.S. withdrawal and Maliki’s anti-Sunni
dictatorship had forged the conditions that led to the formation of ISIS 79.
With the rise of ISIS, the rhetoric of fear once again made a comeback under
Obama. For instance, Obama called ISIS “a cancer” on September 10, 2014 80. Obama’s
focus on ISIS drove the previously isolationist public to support conflict against the
group in Iraq and in Syria 81. In the end, Obama’s goals of closing Guantanamo, ending
the Iraq War and conducting a more humane anti-terror campaign were all scuppered.
Conclusion: Obama as Bush Lite?
The view of President Obama as soft on terrorism still resonates. His opponents
have accused him of not taking the war on terror seriously, of viewing it as strictly a
domestic law enforcement matter, and of refusing to acknowledge that “Islamic
radicals” were behind terrorism 82. A key criticism seemed to stem from President
Obama’s alleged over-sympathy for Muslims and his concomitant adherence to
universalist values 83. This criticism became a common trope in the 2016 Republican
Presidential campaign where candidates challenged Obama to call America’s
adversaries “radical Islamic terrorists” 84.
The reality of Obama’s rhetoric and conduct were much different. Jessica Stern
wrote that Obama basically continued the same plan for countering terrorism that
George W. Bush did. Obama’s rhetoric may have been more scant and idealistic, while
Bush’s was more voluminous and aggressive, but Stern found few other differences.
Stern saw state failure in the Middle East, and more specifically the rise of ISIS, as a
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major factor in the continued need to focus on the terror threat. While Obama stopped
Bush’s harsh interrogation techniques, he turned a blind eye as America’s Middle East
allies continued to employ them. His extensive drone strike program served as a
counterweight against his strategy of engagement with communities where extremists
were located 85.
Far from the “anti-Bush,” Peter Feaver described Obama as “Bush Lite.” Feaver
argued that Obama continued most of Bush’s strategies with only slight deviations.
George W. Bush set the terror war agenda as one that was bent on a moral crusade.
Bush explained that moral values and America’s commitment to protect human rights
were more important than material factors such as “the balance of military forces.”
President Obama had a similar point of view and believed in “an endless campaign to
impose our values.” Both leaders stated repeatedly that weapons of mass destruction
getting into the hands of terrorists was a very important and serious threat to America.
President Obama emphasized global leadership and global security in his national
security strategy (NSS). He said that both of these depend on the presence of
responsible American leadership, which was the theme of Bush’s national security
strategy as well. Bush’s NSS explained that, “the international community is most
engaged in such action when the United States leads.” Obama put less emphasis on the
point that America was at war than Bush did, but his national security strategy reflected
a similar view of the conflict 86. As the charts and data above evidenced, Obama
attempted to be more narrow in his definition of America’s adversaries, yet his conduct
belied a wide view of the war on terror including drone strikes in Somalia, Pakistan and
Yemen.
Trevor McCrisken contends that Obama’s continuation of Bush’s policies was all by
design. McCrisken argues that Obama’s supporters “selectively” listened to his
speeches and missed the themes of counterterrorism present in Obama’s words. The
author even notes that former Bush officials were “shaking their heads with
amazement” at the continuity of Bush’s policies under the supposedly transformational,
liberal Obama 87.
President Obama did speak substantially less about the terror threat than Bush 43
did and he did more to try to diminish it. However, he did not have many policies to
sell and the agenda had been set for him. Further, Americans were firmly concerned
with terrorism. Barack Obama’s idealistic campaigning was twisted by a complex
reality that, given the vast resources committed to the war on terror, had an inertia of its
own. Obama’s general rhetorical arc looked similar to his rhetorical evolution on
terrorism. Jeffrey Tulis praised Obama for his pragmatism and his ability to provide “a
series of concrete responses to practical problems.” At first, Obama was criticized for
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not using his oratory enough in his quest to frame himself as a post-partisan leader.
Unfortunately, Obama caved to his critics when, three years into his first term, he
devolved into a partisan campaigner 88.
President Obama’s paucity of major terrorism speeches is actually evidence that he
and his predecessor carried out similar policies. Obama made fewer speeches because
he sold fewer policies—he mostly kept Bush’s policies alive. He could have made a
more concerted push to close Guantanamo, but the intricacies of the legal and political
process stifled him. He did push a surge in Afghanistan and a fight against ISIS. To his
credit, both policies were successfully sold to an American public that was now used to
the fight against global terrorism.
Obama only slightly adjusted Bush’s policies and, in many cases, sold similar
themes regarding the terror threat. Since the agenda in the war against terror—an
expansive, global war—had been set, Obama did not have to make speeches to continue
with the existing status quo. This he largely did, with the notable exceptions of his
ending the Bush torture program and attempting to end the Iraq War. The drone
assassination program he greatly expanded was kept (an open) secret and he did not
attempt to sell it to the American public.
In the end, Obama’s recalibration of the terror threat left America where it had been
before: still at war in Iraq and Afghanistan with international terrorists and with the
same apparatus at home for fighting terrorists including the USA Patriot Act and
Department of Homeland Security. Obama’s cooler rhetoric, as depicted in the charts
and tables above, was meant to reduce the threat felt by the American public, but it
instead caught him flat-footed as ISIS took over large regions of Iraq and Syria. After
the rise of ISIS, Obama’s turn back to the narrative set by Bush was complete as he
emphasized the fearful and militaristic themes established by his predecessor. In the
next chapter we turn to President Donald Trump whose rhetoric and policies have
ushered in a new era of Islamophobia. Trump, like Obama, set out to undo the policies
and rhetorical tenor of his predecessor.
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